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Abstract
Humans are extremely susceptible to social influence. Here, we examine whether this susceptibility is altered in autism, a 
condition characterized by social difficulties. Autistic participants (N = 22) and neurotypical controls (N = 22) completed a 
memory test of previously seen words and were then exposed to answers supposedly given by four other individuals. Autistic 
individuals and controls were as likely to alter their judgements to align with inaccurate responses of group members. These 
changes reflected both temporary judgement changes (public conformity) and long-lasting memory changes (private conform-
ity). Both groups were more susceptible to answers believed to be from other humans than from computer algorithms. Our 
results suggest that autistic individuals and controls are equally susceptible to social influence when reporting their memories.
Keywords Autism · Social cognition · Conformity · Memory
Humans are highly influenced by their social environment 
and frequently conform to the judgements, opinions, beliefs, 
and actions of others (Asch 1955; Haun et al. 2013; Izuma 
and Adolphs 2013; Smith et al. 2007). This tendency is so 
powerful that people’s perceptions, preferences, and memo-
ries often change when they contradict a larger consensus, 
even in cases where the majority is wrong (Meade and Roe-
diger 2002; Hirst and Echterhoff 2012; Lewandowsky et al. 
2012). A reduced tendency to conform would make individ-
uals “immune” to some of the dangers of social conformity, 
such as blindly relying on groups with inaccurate informa-
tion or falling prey to propaganda. However, reduced social 
conformity could also cause individuals to feel isolated 
and separated from their social environment. A decrease in 
social conformity could also result in learning impairments, 
as learning is often accomplished in a social setting allowing 
individuals to automatically benefit from others’ knowledge.
Because Autism Spectrum Disorders (henceforth autism) 
are characterized both by learning impairments (O’Brien 
and Pearson 2004) as well as social isolation and disengage-
ment (Orsmond et al. 2013; Howlin and Moss 2012), it has 
been suggested that autism may be associated with reduced 
social conformity (Marsh et al. 2013).
To our knowledge only one study to date examined 
this suggestion in adults (Bowler and Worley 1994; but 
see Maras and Bowler 2011, 2012; North et al. 2008 for 
investigation of related constructs). That study compared 
a small sample of autistic1 adults to neurotypical con-
trols and found similar conformity rates in both groups 
(Bowler and Worley 1994). However, a study examining 
children (Yafai et al. 2014) found that autistics conformed 
less than neurotypical controls, with higher scores on a 
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scale measuring autistic traits negatively associated with 
social conformity. A similar association of autistic traits 
and lower sensitivity to peer influence was also reported in 
a study assessing adolescents within the domain of proso-
cial behaviour. However, this effect was only observed for 
‘antisocial’ peer influence (when peers did not cooper-
ate), and did not hold up for ‘prosocial’ peer influence 
(when peers did cooperate) (Van Hoorn et al. 2017). At the 
group level, this study found autistic adolescents exhibited 
equivalent social conformity to neurotypical controls (Van 
Hoorn et al. 2017). Given the very limited literature on the 
topic and the diversity of the populations studied (e.g., in 
terms of age) it is unclear whether autism is indeed associ-
ated with changes to social conformity.
Moreover, when examining social conformity, it could 
be beneficial to dissociate public conformity and private 
conformity. Making socially conforming judgements that 
follow the crowd is not always accompanied by an internal 
change to beliefs (Haun et al. 2013; Kelman 1961; Meade 
and Roediger 2002; Smith et al. 2007). At times, individu-
als will select to overtly conform purely for social gain and 
approval (i.e., to avoid rejection, ridicule or punishment) 
but privately maintain their original beliefs (Asch 1955; 
Kelman 1961; Smith et al. 2007). This type of conformity 
is often referred to as ‘public conformity’. ‘Private con-
formity’, on the other hand, describes a situation in which 
individuals internalize the opinion of the crowd resulting 
in a long-lasting, persistent change to beliefs, preferences, 
and memories (Edelson et al. 2011). These two types of 
conformity are associated with different cognitive and 
neural processes (Edelson et al. 2011), which have often 
been confounded in research. Autistic individuals could 
display one type of conformity but not the other, neither 
type, or both. In particular, public conformity involves a 
desire to fit in (or feeling pressured to do so), while private 
conformity involves putting greater weight on the group’s 
opinion than our own, resulting in persistent modifica-
tion of beliefs, preferences, and memories. Dissociating 
between private and public conformity effects in autism 
may thus be informative for understanding the mechanisms 
underlying some of the social challenges associated with 
this population.
To that end, we adapted a well-studied conformity task 
(Edelson et al. 2011, 2014a, 2014b) that involves multiple 
memory tests to quantify judgement modification follow-
ing the introduction of social influence and its subsequent 
removal. In this context, private conformity is considered 
a case in which individuals persist in favouring the option 
endorsed by the group even after social influence is removed. 
Public conformity is thought not to involve internalization 
and is thus expected to reverse when the reliability of the 
socially conveyed information abates (Asch 1955; Kelman 
1961; Smith et al. 2007).
We specifically wanted to test how information endorsed 
by other humans influences autistic individuals, while con-
trolling for the ability to extract information from others or 
attend to other people. Thus, we used a task in which partici-
pants receive information from others that are not physically 
in the room with them at the time of influence (Edelson et al. 
2011, 2014a, 2014b). This is analogous to asking whether 
autistic individuals would be influenced by ratings on Ama-
zon that contradict their own, for example.
Our task examines social conformity in the domain of 
memory. It has been suggested that autism may be associated 
with specific memory impairments such as reduced ability 
to monitor memory source (Craig et al. 2016; Maras and 
Bowler 2014; Bowler et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 2016) and 
increased reliance on familiarity (Bowler et al. 2000), though 
recollection is not always found to be impaired in autism 
(e.g., North et al. 2008; Maras and Bowler 2012). If autistic 
individuals do have difficulties in memory, they may rely 
on others’ recollections to fill their own gaps. Our paradigm 
enables us to quantify baseline differences in memory sepa-
rately from memory conformity. Furthermore, to be able to 
differentiate effects of social influence from non-social influ-
ence, we manipulate the source of information presented 
to the participants as either coming from other participants 
(social) or from computer algorithms (non-social).
Methods
Participants
Sample size was determined based on past studies (Edelson 
et al. 2011, 2014a, 2014b). 33 neurotypical control (NC) 
adults with no history of psychiatric or neurological con-
ditions and 23 autistic adults (autism) participated in the 
study. One NC participant was excluded due to neither 
understanding nor following task instructions, three par-
ticipants were excluded due to technical faults (one autism, 
two NCs), and eight NC participants were excluded as a 
result of debriefing responses indicating that they may have 
guessed the ‘group’ responses were fabricated. These eight 
participants did not differ from included control participants 
on intelligence (WTAR standardized scores, t(24) = .074, 
p = .942), or demographics: age, t(28) = .338, p = .738, gen-
der, t(28) = 1.269, p = .215, or AQ scores, t(24) = 1.393, 
p = .176. Note, that the 24% exclusion rate due to the suspi-
cion of deception is in line with previous studies of social 
conformity (Edelson et al. 2011, 2014a; Stang 1976; Stricker 
et al. 1967; Mori and Arai 2010).
The resulting final sample of 44 participants included 22 
autistic individuals (10 female) and 22 NCs (14 female). 
The groups were matched at the group level on age (autism 
mean = 24.4, SE = 1.64; NC mean = 23.23, SE = 1.22; 
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t(42) = .577, p = .567) and verbal IQ as predicted from 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) scores (autism 
mean = 108.53, SE = 1.62; NC mean = 111.83 SE = 1.63; 
t(33) = 1.44, p = .159, 5 NC participants and 4 autistic par-
ticipants failed to complete this test).
Autistic participants were recruited via the Autism 
Research Centre, Cambridge (N = 18) and local Autism/
Asperger Syndrome services and support groups (N = 4). All 
autistic participants met a diagnosis for High Functioning 
Autism (HFA, N = 7) or Asperger Syndrome (AS, N = 15), 
and received their diagnosis following specialist assessment 
by a qualified clinician. To support diagnosis, Autism Spec-
trum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) scores for 
all autistic participants were obtained from the Cambridge 
Autism Research Database or via administration of the ques-
tionnaire (mean = 33.77, SE = 1.58) and were significantly 
higher than NC participants’ AQ scores (mean = 16.44, 
SE = .89; t(38) = − 8.994, p = .004, three NC participants 
failed to complete this test). Woodbury-Smith et al. (2005) 
found that an AQ score greater than or equal to 26 resulted 
in the highest proportion of their sample being correctly 
classified as having a diagnosis of autism. All autistic par-
ticipants in our sample had an AQ score above 25 and all NC 
participants had a score below 25. All neurotypical controls 
were recruited via the University online participant pool. 
Participants gave written informed consent prior to partici-
pating and were compensated for their time. The study was 
approved by the University Research Ethics Committee.
Stimuli
Two hundred and fifty emotionally neutral nouns, 4–7 let-
ters in length, randomly selected from the Bristol Norms 
(Stadthagen-Gonzalez and Davis 2006) were used in the 
experiment. Presentation order was randomized for each 
participant.
Procedure
Our methods and analysis followed a well-studied procedure 
that helps dissociate between public and private conformity 
(Edelson et al. 2011, 2014a, 2014b). We made three changes 
to the procedure: (i) the stimuli used were words (while the 
original task uses a film), (ii) the delay between the differ-
ent tests was shorter in order to complete testing in 1 day 
and (iii) group members were represented on the screen as 
cartoon figures instead of photographs.
The experiment protocol (Fig. 1) spanned four phases 
over approximately 4 h and included a word encoding phase, 
followed by three recognition memory tests: baseline (Test 
1), followed by a 30-min break, manipulation (Test 2), fol-
lowed by a 45-min break, and recovery (Test 3). All phases 
were programmed and run using MATLAB (Mathworks 
Inc.) and the Cogent 2000 toolbox. Participants took part 
in groups of five unacquainted individuals including one 
autistic participant, one or two NC participants, and two or 
three confederates. None of the participants included in the 
sample indicated suspicion that any of the group members 
were confederates. All groups included females and males, 
and the proportion between females and males was not fixed 
but differed for each group. Participants were not given any 
information about the other participants during the recruit-
ment process nor during the experiment itself. Controls were 
not aware the study included autistic individuals, and autistic 
participants were not informed whether other participants 
in the group were autistic. Participants were told they might 
encounter the other members of the group during the breaks 
and were instructed not to discuss the experiment with the 
other participants at that time. They did not know whether 
they would also meet again at the end of the study.
Encoding
Participants sat together in a room and completed informed 
consent and demographics forms. Participants were told they 
would be shown a series of words on a single screen visible 
to all group members and that they should attend to all of 
the words in preparation for a later memory test. In addition, 
participants were told that some words would appear twice 
in a row and were instructed to write down the first letter 
of any word that appeared twice in a row, but not to write 
down anything else. These duplicate words were included 
to maintain participants’ attention during encoding. Instruc-
tions for the task were followed by 125 words, each of which 
appeared for 2.5 s followed by a fixation cross for 500 ms. 
The five duplicate words were later included as practice tri-
als for each memory test.
Baseline (Test 1)
Immediately following the encoding stage, participants 
were taken to adjacent individual cubicles to complete 
the rest of the experiment. This first recognition memory 
test served to assess the participants’ baseline memory 
accuracy and confidence before the manipulation phase 
and was comprised of the presentation of 120 words that 
had been shown during the encoding stage (‘old words’) 
and 120 new, unstudied words in random order (Fig. 1a). 
The task started with 10 practice trials of 5 old (the dupli-
cated words) and 5 new words. Each word was displayed 
alone for 2  s before the options ‘new’ and ‘old’ were 
presented on either side of the screen. The lateral posi-
tion of ‘old’ and ‘new’ reversed randomly to ensure that 
participants thought about each response and participants 
were warned this would happen. Participants were asked 
to indicate whether a word was ‘old’ or ‘new’ using a key 
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press (‘g’ for the option on the left, ‘h’ for the option on 
the right). Participants then rated their confidence in their 
response on a scale from 0 to 100. Judgement and confi-
dence responses were self-paced. The test was followed 
by a 30-min break during which participants could relax. 
During this time participants were told that the experi-
menter was ‘uploading’ each participant’s Test 1 responses 
for the next phase.
Fig. 1  Task. Participants viewed words in groups of five participants 
and subsequently performed three memory tests individually. a An 
example trial of Test 1, which served to assess the participants’ ini-
tial memory and confidence before the manipulation administered in 
Test 2. On each trial participants viewed a word and were asked to 
indicate whether they had seen the word in the first part of the study 
(old) or not (new) and indicate their confidence in their answer. b–e 
Test 2 consisted of trials of four different conditions. In all conditions 
a word was presented for 2  s, followed by either the fabricated co-
observers’ answers for 2 s or the computer answers. Participants then 
submitted their answer (old or new) and confidence level. b In the 
Social Manipulation trials all co-observers’ answers were incorrect. 
c In the Non-Social Manipulation trials all computer answers were 
incorrect. d In the No-Manipulation condition ‘XX’ was displayed 
instead of co-observers’ answers or instead of computer answers (the 
latter not shown in the figure). e In the Credibility Condition variable 
patterns of co-observers’ answers (or computer answers) were dis-
played. a Test 3 was the same as Test 1 and served to identify mem-
ory errors that persisted after the manipulation was removed
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Manipulation (Test 2)
Here an attempt was made to influence participants’ answers 
(Fig. 1b). Manipulations were performed in two blocks: a 
social condition (120 trials) and a computer condition (120 
trials) with order counterbalanced across participants. Par-
ticipants answered all 240 memory questions as in Test 1, 
but this time before answering, they were presented with 
the Test 1 answers supposedly given by their four fellow 
co-participants (social condition) or by four computer pro-
grams (computer condition). Each word appeared alone 
for 2 s followed by the answers from four co-observers or 
four computer programs for 2 s before participants could 
respond. Answers remained on the screen until the partici-
pant responded and then participants indicated their confi-
dence in their response. For the social condition, participants 
were instructed that the responses were anonymous answers 
from the other members of their group in Test 1. For the 
non-social condition, participants were told four computer 
programs had searched a database of words and chosen the 
answer most likely to be correct according to an algorithm 
(no detail on the nature of the algorithm was revealed), and 
that the accuracy of this algorithm was comparable to the 
average human participant. Co-observers and computer pro-
grams were represented with cartoon drawings. Participants 
were instructed that the answers of co-observers and com-
puter programs could be used to assist their retrieval but 
that they were ultimately required to answer according to 
their own memory. The co-observer and computer program 
answers were pseudo-randomly allocated into three different 
categories as follows (see Fig. 1b–e).
Manipulation Trials (40 Social Trials, 40 Computer Trials) The 
function of these trials is to estimate the effect of social/non-
social influence. The trials included words for which par-
ticipants had correctly answered ‘old’ or ‘new’ during Test 
1 and their confidence was within 20–90% of their range of 
confidence ratings. This confidence range was increased to 
a maximum of 15–95% if the former range did not gener-
ate 80 trials in total. Crucially, for these manipulation trials, 
all four responses from co-observers (Fig. 1b) or computers 
(Fig. 1c) were incorrect. Previous studies show that unani-
mous responses of group members elicit the strongest and 
most consistent conformity (Asch 1955; Edelson et al. 2011, 
2014a).
No Manipulation Control Trials (10 Trials in Social Block, 10 
Trials in Computer Block) The function of these trials is to 
estimate baseline forgetting. The same criteria were used to 
select stimuli as for the Manipulation trials. Here, the letters 
‘XX’ were presented instead of a response from co-observ-
ers (Fig. 1d) or computers, thus providing participants with 
no new information.
Credibility Trials (70 Social Trials, 70 Computer Trials) The 
function of these trials was to reduce the likelihood that 
participants would suspect that responses were fabricated. 
The stimuli presented here included all remaining stimuli 
presented during Test 1. ‘Responses’ of the co-observers or 
computer programs were determined as follows: Test 1 tri-
als that had a confidence below the threshold for manipu-
lation trials were presented with responses that showed a 
‘split-decision’, (i.e., 2 said old and 2 said new), and the 
remaining trials showed that 3 or all 4 co-observers (Fig. 1e) 
or computer responses were in agreement with the partici-
pant’s response during Test 1, regardless of whether it was 
correct or not.
Following Test 2, there was a 45-min break during which 
participants completed a separate decision-making task in 
which they rated food and drink preferences and obtained a 
highly rated food or drink item.
Recovery (Test 3)
Here, following Edelson et al. (2011), we attempted to ret-
roactively dissociate private and public conformity. Before 
beginning Test 3, participants were informed that the 
answers given by the co-observers and computer programs 
during the previous session had actually been determined 
randomly, rendering these answers uninformative. The par-
ticipants were then requested to complete the same memory 
test again (Test 3) based on their memory of the words, fol-
lowing the same procedure as Test 1. Items that the partici-
pants answered correctly in Test 1 but incorrectly in both 
Tests 2 and 3 are considered items that reflect long lasting 
changes to memory (‘private’ conformity). Items that the 
participants answered correctly in Test 1, incorrectly in Test 
2, but then reverted back to the original correct answer when 
social influence was lifted in Test 3, are considered items 
that reflect ‘public’ conformity.
Following Test 3, participants completed an online 
debriefing form and three questionnaires:
1. Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS, Liebowitz 1987) 
which includes 24 items, has a Chronbach’s alpha of 
.95 (Liebowitz 1987; Baker et al. 2002) and high reli-
ability in neurotypical individuals (Heimberg et  al. 
1999; Fresco et al. 2001; Masia-Warner et al. 2003; 
von Glischinski et al. 2018) and autistics (Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2001). The LSAS scores correlate with AQ scores 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001).
2. Mehrabian Social Conformity Scale (Mehrabian and 
Stefl 1995), which includes 11 items, has an alpha of .77 
(Mehrabian and Stefl 1995) and high reliability (Meh-
rabian and Stefl 1995; Wu and Chang 2012; Vučković 
et al. 2010).
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3. Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, Wechsler 
2001), which includes 50 items, has been co-normed 
with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
III) and has high reliability in neurotypical individuals 
(Mathias et al. 2007; Green et al. 2008) and in autistics 
(Freeman et al. 1985; Venter et al. 1992).
Analyses
We calculated the error rates during Test 2 for the four con-
ditions of interest (social manipulation condition, computer 
manipulation condition, no-manipulation condition in social 
block, no-manipulation condition in computer block) as 
number of trials for which the participant gave an incorrect 
answer in that condition divided by number of trials in that 
condition. For example, if a participant was incorrect on 20 
trials out of the 40 social manipulation trials in Test 2, then 
their error rate is 0.5 (or 50%) in that condition.
All statistical results in which we compare groups or test 
for correlations with AQ score (i.e. partial correlations) are 
reported while controlling for possible difference in base-
line memory performance (rather than susceptibility to the 
manipulation) by subtracting for each participant errors in 
the specific no-manipulation control trials from errors in the 
specific manipulation trials and conducting statistical tests 
on those corrected numbers. For example, if participant’s 
error rate was 0.5 in the social manipulation condition and 
0.4 in the no-manipulation condition in the social block than 
their score would be 0.5 − 0.4 = 0.1. In addition, all ANO-
VAs and correlation statistics are reported controlling for 
gender. As there has been an ongoing debate on whether 
gender is related to social conformity (Stein et al. 1986; Carr 
1998; Cross et al. 2017), as well as the expression of autism 
symptoms (Sipes et al. 2011; Thompson et al. 2003; Lai 
et al. 2015) we decided to include gender as a covariate in 
our analyses.
In Test 3 we calculated persistent errors that were due to 
the manipulation experienced in Test 2. This was achieved 
by calculating the number of trials participants answered 
incorrectly on Test 3 and Test 2, separately for trials in 
which they experienced a social manipulation, computer 
manipulation, no-manipulation social block, or no-manip-
ulation computer block in Test 2, divided by the number 
of trials in that condition. For example, if the participant 
answered 20 of 40 social-manipulation questions incorrectly 
in Test 2 and out of those still answered 15 incorrectly in 
Test 3, their persistent error rate for the social manipulation 
condition is 15/40 = 0.375 (or 37.5%). Trials for which they 
answered incorrectly in Test 2 but reverted to correct answer 
in Trial 3 are transient errors. In our example this is equal to 
5/40 = 0.125 (or 12.5%).
Again, all statistical analyses are reported while control-
ling for possible difference in baseline memory accuracy 
(rather than susceptibility to the manipulation) by subtract-
ing for each participant the persistent error rate in the spe-
cific no-manipulation trials from the persistent error rate in 
the specific manipulation trials and conducting statistical 
tests on those corrected numbers. For example, if a partici-
pant’s persistent error rate was 0.375 in the social manipula-
tion condition and 0.2 in the no-manipulation control con-
dition in the social block then their persistent error score 
would be 0.375 − 0.2 = 0.175. In addition, all ANOVAs and 
correlation statistics are reported controlling for gender.
For null results a Bayes Factor (BF) was calculated using 
JASP software (JASP Team 2018, Version 0.8.5) with a 
Bayes Factor of 0 < BF < 1 indicating support for the null 
hypothesis, 1 < BF indicating non-significant support for the 
alternative hypothesis and 3 < BF indicating significant sup-
port for the alternative hypothesis (Kass and Raftery 1995).
Results
We first tested whether autistic participants would alter their 
previously correct response to match the incorrect response 
of the group and whether their conformity rate differed 
from control participants. Submitting Test 2 errors into a 
group (autistics/NC) by condition (social manipulation/
computer manipulation) ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of condition (F(1,41) = 4.956, p = .032), with no difference 
between groups (F(1,41) = .013, p = .909) nor an interaction 
(F(1,41) = .124, p = .727). The effect of condition was due 
to the social manipulation inducing greater memory errors 
than the computer manipulation condition both in autistics 
and NC participants (autism group: t(21) = 2.137, p < .05, 
NC group: t(21) = 4.365, p < .001).
In particular, autistic participants conformed to the major-
ity opinion in 66.3% ± 5.6% of social manipulation trials on 
Test 2, giving an incorrect answer to questions they had 
answered correctly in baseline Test 1. For controls this 
was true in 58.9% ± 4.1% of social manipulation trials (no 
difference between the groups on socially induced errors, 
t(42) = − .154, p = .878, BF = .300). Errors were also induced 
by computers in autistic participants (who conformed to 
the majority incorrect opinion of computer algorithms in 
50.7% ± 6.0% of computer manipulation trials) and controls 
(44.7% ± 5.2%) with no difference in this tendency between 
groups (t(42) = .225, p = .823, BF = .304). These findings 
show that autistic participants altered their responses to 
match false responses of others as often as controls.
No correlation was found between AQ score and con-
formity in response to social (r(37) = .147, p = .371) or com-
puter (r(37) = − .027, p = .872) manipulation (Fig. 2b) and 
AQ was not correlated to the Mehrabian Social Conformity 
Scale, r(37) = .046, p = .783 (Mehrabian and Stefl 1995). 
Equally, WTAR scores were not related to conformity in 
1310 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders (2019) 49:1304–1315
1 3
the social r(44) = .142, p = .357, BF = .283, or the computer 
condition r(44) = .185, p = .229, BF = .379.
Next, we tested whether conformity could be explained 
by differences in baseline memory errors or social anxiety. 
As a reminder, all statistical tests were conducted while 
controlling for performance on no-manipulation trials. The 
latter is subtracted from each participant’s performance 
on manipulation trials to control for possible difference 
in memory per se. None of the results change, however, if 
performance on no-manipulation trials is not controlled for, 
and there is no significant difference between groups on no-
manipulation trials. Specifically, for the no-manipulation 
trials in the social block incorrect answers were given by 
autistic participants in 30.0% ± 3.0% of the trials (which is 
significantly lower than their social manipulation error rate: 
t(21) = − 6.773, p < .001) and in controls on 23.6% ± 3.7% 
(which is significantly lower than their social manipula-
tion error rate, t(21) = − 9.035, p < .001), with no difference 
between groups, (t(42) = − 1.334, p = .189, BF = .606). 
Equally, in the computer block, autistic participants were 
incorrect in 31.4% ± 4.2% of the no-manipulation trials 
(which is significantly lower than their computer manipu-
lation error rate, t(21) = − 3.201, p = .004) and controls in 
23.6% ± 3.3% (which is significantly lower than their com-
puter manipulation error rate, t(21) = − 4.610, p < .001), 
again with no difference between groups (t(42) = − 1.459, 
p = .152, BF = .609). These results indicate no difference in 
baseline rate of forgetting across groups (see also North et al. 
2008; Maras and Bowler 2012).
Consistent with previous literature (Liss et al. 2008) 
we found that autistics scored higher on the social anxiety 
scale than controls (autism mean = 67.91, SE = 6.70, NC 
mean = 26.86, SE = 3.06, t(42) = − 5.571, p < .001). We thus 
repeated all group comparisons and correlations above in 
which we compare groups or correlate with AQ score while 
controlling for social anxiety. This did not alter any of the 
results. Thus, conformity cannot be explained by differences 
in baseline memory errors or social anxiety.
Do autistic and control participants make a similar 
amount of persistent errors? There was no difference 
between autistic and control participants in the frequency 
of persistent errors. A group (autistics/controls) by condi-
tion (social manipulation/computer manipulation) ANOVA 
on persistent errors revealed a main effect of condition 
(F(1,41) = 8.806, p = .005), with no difference between 
groups (F(1,41) = 1.588, p = .215) nor an interaction 
(F(1,41) = .314, p = .578). The main effect of condition was 
characterized by greater persistent errors due to the social 
manipulation than the computer manipulation.
In particular, when social influence was removed (Test 
3), autistic participants maintained erroneous memory 
responses in 28.1% ± 2.3% of social manipulation trials 
(persistent errors, private conformity). These numbers were 
not different from the control participants, who maintained 
erroneous memory responses in 27.0 ± 2.5% of social manip-
ulation trials (persistent social errors, difference between 
groups t(42) = 1.006, p = .320, BF = .447) (Fig. 3a). Equally, 
when influence of computer algorithm was removed (Test 
Fig. 2  Conformity rates. a Both autistic and neurotypical controls 
were more likely to conform to the erroneous answers believed to 
be of other participants (social manipulation) than to those believed 
to have been generated from computers (computer manipulation) 
on questions they had previously answered correctly. Displayed are 
the error rates of the manipulation condition after subtracting base-
line error rates from the no-manipulation condition (thus controlling 
for simple forgetting). b Conformity rates did not correlate with AQ 
score. Error bars SEM, n.s not significant
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3), autistic participants maintained erroneous answers in 
22.5% ± 2.8% (persistent errors). These numbers were again 
not different from the NC participants, who maintained erro-
neous answers in 19.2% ± 2.7% (persistent computer errors, 
difference between groups t(42) = .621, p = .538, BF = .348). 
No correlation was found between AQ score and frequency 
of persistent errors (r(37) = − .015, p = .925) in the social 
condition (Fig. 3b) or computer condition (r(37) = − .017, 
p = .919, Fig. 3b). While there were no differential effects 
between groups nor interaction, we do note that controls 
were significantly less likely to exhibit persistent errors due 
to computer influence than social influence (t(21) = 2.825 
p = .010, BF = 4.916), a difference that was not significant in 
autistics (t(21) = 1.626, p = .119, BF = .695). This suggests 
that persistent errors due to social influence are comparable 
in autistics and controls.
We then tested whether persistent errors due to social 
conformity could be explained by forgetting. In only 
17.7% ± 3.0% of trials for which no manipulation was previ-
ously administered, autistic participants persisted in provid-
ing incorrect answers in Test 3 and this number was signifi-
cantly lower than their social manipulation persistent error 
rate, (t(21) = 3.178, p < .005). For neurotypical controls the 
corresponding number was 12.3% ± 1.9%, which is signifi-
cantly lower than their social manipulation persistent error 
rate (t(21) = 4.975, p < .0001).
Persistent errors in autistic individuals in the computer 
manipulation condition seemed to be due to forgetting. In 
particular, in 19.5% ± 3.1% of trials for which no manipu-
lation was previously administered in the computer condi-
tion, participants persisted in providing incorrect answers in 
Test 3 and this number was not significantly lower than their 
computer manipulation persistent error rate (t(21) = .923, 
p < .366). For neurotypical controls the corresponding num-
ber was 13.6% ± 2.8%, which was not significantly lower 
than their computer manipulation persistent error rate, but 
was trending (t(21) = 2.034, p = .055). As before, repeating 
all tests above in which we compare groups (or correlate 
with AQ score) while controlling for social anxiety did not 
alter the results. In sum, persistent errors due to social con-
formity cannot be explained by forgetting.
Do autistic and control participants make a similar 
amount of transient errors? For transient errors (public con-
formity), the ANOVA revealed no main effects nor inter-
action (condition: F(1, 41) = 0.180 p = .673; group: F(1, 
41) = 0.725, p = .40; interaction: F(1, 41) = 0.850, p = .362). 
Interestingly, this suggests that the unique effect of social 
influence (compared to non-social influence) was restricted 
to persistent, long-term errors.
The effect of condition on transient error rates was com-
parable between both groups. In particular, when social 
influence was removed (Test 3), autistic participants reverted 
back to their correct Test 1 responses in 38.2% ± 4.3% of 
social manipulation trials (transient errors, public conform-
ity). These numbers were not different from the NC partici-
pants, who reverted back to their correct Test 1 responses in 
31.8% ± 2.6% of social manipulation trials (transient social 
errors, difference between groups t(42) = − .985, p = .330, 
BF = .439). Transient errors due to social manipulation were 
not correlated with AQ score (r(37) = 0.186, p = .258).
When influence of computer algorithm was removed 
(Test 3), autistic participants reverted back to their correct 
Test 1 answers in 28.2% ± 3.9% (transient errors) which was 
not significantly different from their social manipulation 
Fig. 3  Persistent errors (private conformity). a During Test 3, after 
social/computer influence was lifted, autistic individuals exhibited a 
similar rate of persistent memory errors on questions for which they 
previously conformed to the erroneous answers of the group as neu-
rotypical controls. Persistent error rate was greater for trials previ-
ously presented in the social manipulation condition than the com-
puter manipulation condition, with no group by condition interaction. 
Displayed are the persistent error rates of the manipulation condition 
after subtracting baseline persistent error rates from the no-manipu-
lation condition (thus controlling for simple forgetting). b Persistent 
error rates did not correlate with AQ score. Error bars SEM, n.s. not 
significant
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condition (t(21) = − 1.726, p = .099). These numbers were 
not different from the NC participants, who reverted back 
to their correct Test 1 answer in 25.5% ± 3.3% (transient 
computer errors, difference between groups t(42) = − .183, 
p = .855, BF = .302), which was not different from their 
social manipulation condition (t(21) = − 1.291, p = .211). 
Transient errors due to computer manipulation were not cor-
related with AQ score (r(37) = − 0.027, p = .872). Baseline 
memory and confidence were comparable between groups 
(Table 1). These findings show that transient errors due to 
social influence are comparable in autistics and controls 
(Table 1).
Discussion
When faced with a situation in which members of the group 
unanimously express a belief that is contradictory to one’s 
own, most individuals will alter their judgement to align 
with the crowd. Our results suggest that this tendency for 
social conformity is no different in autistic individuals. 
Indeed, both groups of participants (whether autistic or neu-
rotypical controls) altered their previously correct memory 
judgements to align with the false memory of the group 
approximately two times out of three. These cases could 
not be explained away as simple forgetting because in the 
absence of this manipulation participants were significantly 
less likely to alter a correct judgement to an incorrect one. 
Moreover, information said to be provided by other humans 
had a greater impact on the beliefs of both autistic individu-
als and neurotypical controls than information said to be 
provided by computer programs. In addition, autistic indi-
viduals and neurotypical controls displayed similar rates of 
baseline memory accuracy (in line with North et al. 2008; 
Maras and Bowler 2012; but see Maras and Bowler 2011) 
and were equally confident in their memory.
After conforming to the erroneous opinion of others, both 
neurotypical controls and autistic individuals maintained 
these new beliefs at a similar rate after being told that the 
information provided previously was in fact random. These 
cases are thought to reflect a persistent change to beliefs 
due to social influence, termed ‘private conformity’, while 
cases in which participants revert to their original correct 
beliefs are thought to reflect only transient alteration that 
are often referred to as ‘public conformity’. The results are 
consistent with previous findings that autistic adults are 
as susceptible to misinformation as neurotypical controls 
(Maras and Bowler 2011), scoring similarly on scales of 
suggestibility (i.e., personal acceptance of information sug-
gested by another person) (Maras and Bowler 2012; North 
et al. 2008) and on compliance (i.e., the tendency to agree 
with another’s suggestion even when privately disagreeing 
with it) (Maras and Bowler 2012; but see North et al. 2008) 
which are constructs associated with private and public con-
formity, respectively.
It is important to note that while our study suggests 
autistics and controls conform at similar rates, future stud-
ies are needed to examine whether they conform for simi-
lar reasons. There are different reasons why individuals 
conform, including the desire to fit in and the desire to be 
accurate, and it is possible these drives may be more or 
less prominent in autistic individuals as compared to con-
trols. Moreover, we studied conformity for factual infor-
mation and it is unknown whether similar findings will 
be observed for information for which there is no ground 
truth, such as preferences for food or moral judgements. 
We also examined social conformity in a situation in which 
the participants are physically removed from a social con-
text. This design is similar to many previous studies of 
social conformity (Charpentier et al. 2014; Edelson et al. 
2011, 2014a, 2014b; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. 2010, 
2012; Klucharev et al. 2009; Izuma and Adolphs 2013) and 
to what people experience online, for example via social 
media. It is possible that autistic individuals would exhibit 
decreased social conformity when information is conveyed 
directly by other people, perhaps because of reduced sali-
ency and divergent processing of social cues in those situ-
ations (Ashwin et al. 2006; Dawson et al. 2004). That said, 
Table 1  Baseline memory and 
confidence
Baseline memory accuracy and participants’ confidence did not differ between groups. There was also no 
time (T1, T2, T3) by group interaction on confidence ratings (F(2,39) = .981, p = .384, BF = .395)
ASC M (SE) NC M (SE) T, p Bayes factor
Baseline memory accuracy 67.09 (1.81) 69.24 (1.59) .894, p = .376 .41
Confidence
 Baseline (T1) 61.67 (11.11) 66.27 (2.26) − 1.405, p = .168 .65
 Social conformity trials (T2) 62.26 (4.35) 60.94 (3.84) − .227, p = .821 .30
 Computer conformity trials (T2) 55.17 (4.22) 57.33 (3.92) .374, p = .710 .32
 Non-conformity trials (T2) 62.72 (3.48) 65.78 (3.64) .609, p = .546 .35
 Transient error trials (T3) 51.05 (3.40) 52.79 (2.82) .392, p = .697 .32
 Persistent error trials (T3) 51.66 (3.64) 53.00 (3.54) .263, p = .794 .31
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our results are consistent with the one study examining 
social conformity in autistic adults in which all individ-
uals were physically present at time of testing (Bowler 
and Worley 1994). That study, which was restricted to a 
small number of adults with Asperger Syndrome (Bowler 
and Worley 1994), employed the classic Asch conformity 
task, which examines conformity in relation to percep-
tual judgements. The authors found that individuals with 
Asperger Syndrome followed the group’s false judgement 
to a similar extent as neurotypical controls. The Asch con-
formity task is typically thought of as reflecting ‘public 
conformity’ but does not distinguish between public and 
private conformity.
Another study that employed an “Asch conformity task” 
but examined children (age = 9.08 ± 1.42 years), concluded 
autism is associated with a reduction in public conformity 
(Yafai et al. 2014). Another study examining teenagers 
reported a more complicated picture with autism symp-
toms reported to be related to less sensitivity to antisocial 
peer influence but not prosocial peer influence (Van Hoorn 
et al. 2017). The different results between these studies 
and the present experiment may be due to the different 
age of the autistic participants. While autistic individuals 
exhibit a tendency to conform, the extent to which they 
do so differently from neurotypical controls may change 
with age. It may be that adults with autism have acquired 
social conformity as a social strategy, whereas autistic 
children may have yet to develop such a strategy. As our 
study only tested young adults, further research is required 
to characterize age-related changes. It should also be noted 
that criteria for an autism diagnosis have changed over the 
years (see e.g., Maenner et al. 2014) and one limitation 
of comparing studies of autism is that the makeup of the 
resultant diagnostic populations may differ due to diagnos-
tic changes depending on the year the study took place as 
well as potentially whether the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD) was used for diagnosis.
Our results suggest that autistic individuals and neuro-
typical controls are equally susceptible to social influence 
when reporting their memories. Interestingly, mislead-
ing social information led to both transient and persis-
tent changes in beliefs, suggesting that in autism social 
influence also alters not only explicit responses but also 
internal beliefs.
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